ARTICLE

Military Loyalty: A Functional Vice?

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Introduction

In its everyday usage, “loyalty” has a lived moral reality. By that I mean that actors consider loyalty to contain some form of moral action, an “ought” or a “should,” whereby they expect the recipient of their loyalty to reciprocate it somehow. This return on loyalty should neither be construed as some ugly reductionist concern with contracts nor as a concern with trust and return on investment, but as an essential component of what loyalty is. Loyalty denotes a relationship of reciprocity with a strong moral overtone. Elsewhere I have argued that this overtone is problematic when it “arises with value laden emotions, like loyalty, which have a tendency to have a moral aspect attached to their feeling, value and expression.” Melvin Tumin points out that it is fundamentally difficult to critically engage concepts that have strong moral values tied to them. He argues that we have theorized truth, honor, and loyalty as if they were cardinal values, passed down from sacred sources. This renders loyalty undertheorized—it is an assumed component of virtuous interaction. The moral basis to loyalty is quite apparent when we consider the obverse to loyalty—disloyalty. The treasonous, betraying, disloyal actor is considered one of the most heinous. To betray, to not give loyalty to that which gave you loyalty, is popularly considered a profound moral vice. It is this lived moral experience of loyalty that interests me most—actors live out their loyalties and loyalty guides interaction in the social world.

As a sociologist I am not particularly interested in abstract questions of right and wrong, vice and virtue. To me, ascribing a particular moral value to an emotion, such as loyalty, is an exercise in moral discourse and control in the Foucauldian sense. Consequently, I reject an analysis of loyalty that requires me to make a judgment about the inherent worth of loyalty as a concept. Thus I side-step the question of whether loyalty is in and of itself a virtue or vice, and leave that to

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the likes of Simon Keller in his excellent book on loyalty, and Samuel Huntington and followers for loyalty’s virtuous nature in the context of the military. I am much more interested in what this thing, “loyalty,” is; how it changes, directs, and enables (in)action; why we have such a strong cultural reliance on this idea; and what purpose it serves (in the classical functionalist sense). I am also fascinated by its phenomenology; the lived experience of loyalty and how actors make sense of their world by invoking loyalty. To many of my sociology-of-emotion colleagues there is no such thing as a good or bad emotion: jealousy, hate, and love can all be good and/or bad; their moral value comes through the interpretation (meaning-making) of those involved.

Of course, one must be wary of ignoring the commonsense or default view that some passions might be bad and some good.

In the following discussion, I will employ sociological tools, informed by what Jesse Prinz terms epistemic emotionism (that is, the view that moral existence is enacted through feelings), to explain why loyalty is fundamental to morality, how loyalty drives social action, and consequently why being loyal is central to doing wrong in a military context. I do this by considering what loyalty is, how it is inculcated in the military, and the role that emotions have in directing (im)moral acts. Centrally, I explore why loyalty in a military context may predispose soldiers to criminality.

What is Loyalty?

I begin by stressing an earlier point: I posit that loyalty is an emotion. I do this for two key reasons. First, accepting that loyalty is an emotion opens up a range of theoretical perspectives and methodological tools to investigate how it works. Second, many discussions of loyalty in the academic literature have never been able to define adequately what loyalty is. This is because most definitions are too restrictive in relation to a concept that is broad. Keller’s work is, however, an exception. In terms of my own approach, I define loyalty as an emotion that is central to group and individual identity formation. It is crucial to social action and it operates at different levels—or layers, as I prefer to call them. I am rather heartened by the similarity of my definition to Keller’s, given that they were independently arrived at from quite different disciplinary backgrounds. To quote Keller, a philosopher:

*Loyalty is the attitude and associated pattern of conduct that is constituted by an individual’s taking something’s side, and doing so with a certain sort of motive: namely, a motive that is partly emotional in nature, involves a response to the thing itself, and makes essential reference to a special relationship that the individual takes to exist between herself and the thing to which she is loyal.*

One difference between our definitions, however, is that in his view loyalty is only partly emotional, while I suggest it is wholly emotional and that the feeling drives the patterns of conduct. There cannot be loyalty without emotional investment—if we do not feel something then we can not be loyal.
There is a very important point to my discussion of what loyalty is. If we accept that loyalty is an emotion, we can deploy an epistemic emotionist perspective to the question of morals. For this I draw heavily on Prinz’s, The Emotional Construction of Morals (2007). Prinz begins by asserting, “rightness and wrongness, unlike primeness and photosynthesis, are things we feel.” Morals must be emotional because we feel what is right and wrong. Moral judgments are accompanied by feelings: I feel bad when I transgress norms against stealing or hurting another. As Prinz argues, “When we do things that violate moral values, we incur emotional costs.” In his treatise, Jonathan Haidt argues that the rationalist turn in philosophy (and I would add, in much of the social sciences and humanities) is problematic when it comes to moral judgment. Reasoning, he asserts, merely offers a post hoc justification for feeling-directed (im)moral action at the time. Haidt draws upon David Hume’s notorious line of argument attacking rationality: “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them,” and “the ultimate ends of human actions can never...be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind.”

Thus, as evidenced by Haidt’s and Hume’s arguments, although Prinz takes what appears to be a controversial and confrontational line of reasoning, he reflects a long philosophical tradition that asserts the centrality of passion in practical decision-making processes. Prinz argues that “we deliberate about moral dilemmas by pitting emotions against emotions.” For example, the societal restriction on killing another human is a deeply ingrained, visceral moral value that should make us profoundly uncomfortable if we attempt to kill another. Typically, you need intense competing emotions to overcome that barrier, perhaps hate or abject fear. When we are faced with profound moral dilemmas of the type that I will describe shortly—if I should be party to abducting, torturing, and killing someone and then covering up this action—I will be in a psychically and emotionally fraught state as my feelings against murder clash with myriad other feelings. Those other feelings are the ones most likely to be salient and manifest at the moment of killing. In line with my scenario, Prinz asserts that “conflicting rules have different emotional strength, and the stronger emotions win out.” Further, such emotions do not need any rational basis, and the moral precepts that follow from an emotional moral response do not require logical justification. I feel it is wrong, therefore it is wrong. Again, Prinz: “people’s deepest moral values are based not on decisive arguments that they discovered while pondering moral questions, but on deeply inculcated sentiments.”

Thus a person’s moral outlook is formed by and maintained through continuing emotional interactions. These interactions, such as the feeling of shame when we transgress a norm or pride when we uphold a value, affirm our moral outlook and reproduce that moral perspective in both ourselves and others. As Prinz asserts, “normal adults have values that are not maintained by a network of carefully thought-out reasons. They are
implemented by gut feelings.”14 Drawing on Kohlberg’s work on moral development, Prinz goes on to reject utilitarian- and Kantian-based views of moral development and moral good.15 He even goes so far as to suggest, “standard moral concepts do not seem to be grounded in the kinds of principles that dominate philosophical ethics.”16 Thus, though moral questions may deeply occupy the philosopher, for most people these are rarely questions they rationally consider. Jason Powell offers a similar conclusion in his own work. He argues, “emotions erupt during social interaction. Then they are judged for suitability according to cultural and ideological standards, and managed to effect culturally acceptable displays that yield social accord.”17 Most of us live our morals through feelings, content to feel our way through social interaction and make judgments not from informed, rational, and considered positions, but from and through nebulous passions.

I have sufficiently belabored the connection between moral action and emotion. It is neither my purpose to ask how we become moral actors, nor to delve further into moral philosophy.18 What my argument hinges upon in this essay is the strong epistemic emotionist position. To summarize this perspective thus far: morals are emotional, and it is our emotional existence that informs us of right and wrong—it is how we know what we ought to do. This view opens a new perspective on criminal behavior—the quintessential violation of norms—by allowing us to explore and understand actions by reference to feelings. If we can explain why criminals feel a certain way, we can predict the action arising from it.

Fierce Military Bonding

It is a tired trope that soldiers must stick together, fight for each other, and support each other if they are to be effective combatants. We see it repeatedly in cultural representations of brotherhood, such as Stephen Ambrose’s Band of Brothers and Steven Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan, and through formalized rituals of brotherhood, oaths of allegiance, and affirmations of fealty. Soldiers’ memoirs are filled with tales of brotherly fealty to one another and to military unit.

For example, in a 2008 speech, an Australian Governor General, himself a member of the military, noted that there is a:

special relationship of the warrior class; of loyalty to one another, the essential personal discipline freely endured, of shared dangers faced and overcome, of the sharing of everything—water, rations, work parties and sentry duty on the gun pit at night. And after leaving the service that special continuity of those relationships [is maintained] through ANZAC Day, the RSL and unit, ship and squadron ex-service affiliations.19

The expectation that there is something special in the bond of soldiers is a powerful myth. That constructed “special-ness” is intimately tied to the notion of loyalty which, as a concept, partly originates from a feudal military context to denote the connection of noble to lord and king.20 The loyalty of the solider is both revered and reified: it is considered profoundly important to those in the military, and it is understood as a
separate object of worth that causes particular actions. It is claimed to result in all manner of moral good. However, there has been much academic critique of the use of loyalty in the military. I will briefly outline this critique to show how the construction and enactment of loyalty is considered quintessential to military activity. However, I will argue, a contradiction exists in that the very need to train and manipulate the soldier into battle using sentiments of loyalty creates the pre-conditions for moral wrong. The worth of loyalty as a functional answer to the problem of “how shalt thou kill?” does not ameliorate the problem of how loyalty predisposes the actor to immoral act.

A fundamental concern for the military is how to actually get soldiers to fight and kill the enemy. Francis Fukuyama notes this dilemma and argues that:

Military organizations solve this problem not by increasing individual incentives but by replacing individual identities with group identities and reinforcing group identities through tradition, ceremony, and group experiences that are meant to bond soldiers emotionally. . . . The strongest bonds are not to large organizations or abstract causes like the nation; rather they are to the immediate group of soldiers in one’s platoon or squad, before whom one would be ashamed to be a coward.

This interdependent bond is forged by the deployment of socialization techniques and systems comparable to those that Erving Goffman linked with total institutions, and that Susie Scott refers to as reinventive institutions. The role of this socialization process is to separate soldiers from their previous social milieus and inculcate a new way of understanding the world. Central to this process is loyalty, obedience, and the subsuming of one’s individual desires to the needs of the greater cause. Michael Evans, in a strident call for stoic philosophy to be taught in the military and for stoicism to become the guiding philosophy for the profession of arms, stresses “that individuality is embedded within a larger community of comradeship.”

The group is primary, and loyalty to the group paramount.

Intriguingly for discussions of the virtue of filial duty and loyalty, the military takes great pains to construct relationships in familial terms, with familial expectations: “brother,” “family,” “auntie,” and “old man” are all used in the Australian and Canadian military to denote relationships. This is an attempt to draw upon the powerful feelings of familial loyalty which, I argue, is the primary type of loyalty that we learn and enact. Familial loyalty is considered the most motivating and important loyalty of the range of connections we have. It also serves as the prototypical loyalty by which all others are measured. Consequently, the military seeks to co-opt family bonds to the unit of soldiers. It is a sense of family duty, enacted through filial loyalty, that the military wants to create.

In his study of the dynamics of loyalty, Keller makes a strong case for the existence of a duty of loyalty between parents and children. And, of course, duty is strong in military discourse. Furthermore, as Donna Winslow argues, “strong interpersonal relationships and small unit cohesion are seen to be necessary aspects of land warfare. Loyalty is encouraged at all levels as military values and structures grant primacy
to collective goals.” Yoel Elizur and Nuphar Yishay-Krien echo this in their argument that “group cohesion and loyalty are not only part of military culture and important for combat effectiveness, but one’s life, adaptability, and well-being depends on the quality of this web of relationships.” Loyalty is a crucial component of military activity that draws on notions of family loyalty to indicate the strength of that bond, as demonstrated through phrases such as “blood is thicker than water.”

Given that emotion drives social action and we do things because of how we feel, it is not surprising that the military focuses on changing how soldiers feel. Loyalty is deployed in the military setting because it motivates soldiers to act in a particular way. It is one of the structural responses to the individual problem of enabling killing.

Criminal Military

The military and the soldiers that serve within it are, like all of us, subject to moral ambiguities and clashes of principle. And soldiers are called on to make choices. As is generally the case with any sub-culture, a subset of soldiers breach societal norms and engage in criminal activity. However, what is intriguing about soldiers is that they, along with perhaps members of the police and judiciary, are particularly charged by their society to uphold certain moral norms in exceptional circumstances. This is the case in war and in war-like deployments. It is not my purpose here to consider the case for war and the use of sanctioned violence. What is of interest, given my preceding argument for the centrality of emotion to morality and of loyalty to the military, is the effect that being a soldier has on questions of right and wrong. Does the peculiar business of soldiering create a particular challenge for the theorizing of deviance and criminality? If morals are emotional, then how do we understand the immoral choices that some soldiers make when they abuse, rape, and kill non-combatants and subdued combatants?

There are innumerable instances of criminal behavior by soldiers. Abu Ghraib is one atrocity that recently captured the world’s attention; yet it was by no means isolated. As Elizur and Yishay-Krien point out: “It is a universal issue, since no army in the world appears to be exempt, and research indicates that war atrocities are not isolated or infrequent episodes.” The universality of atrocities—every war and every military has them—must lead us to question why and how such acts are systemic and continuing. Indeed, this is a question that many scholars have attempted to address. My slightly different take is that we must consider these moral wrongs as emotional acts inevitably resulting from the socialization processes we have deemed functional for soldiering.

The norm against killing someone is the strongest norm that we have in society. I will side-step the question of whether it is ever right for a soldier to kill, and instead focus on examples that illustrate what in
In civilian circles we would call murder. In 1993, in Somalia, soldiers from a Canadian Airborne Regiment beat to death a bound 16-year-old youth. The incident eventually came to light during a wider investigation into the actions of Canadian military personnel on peacekeeping missions in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia (1993–1994). What this inquiry revealed was a systemic culture of abuse, violence, illegal activity, and cover-up in the military units involved. The murder of Shidane Arone (the victim) was the starkest example of moral failure, but moral failure was not isolated or limited to a specific unit or campaign. Now, it could be argued that the individual soldiers involved somehow avoided moral inculcation and felt no emotional pang at murder, thus making the murder an example of individual moral failure. However, what has been borne out in the inquiries and academic analysis that followed is that unethical behaviors were widespread, systemic, and included entire regiments. What occurred in these military units was perpetrated at a group level. We gain very little insight from an analysis of individual failure in such a context, because such an approach prioritizes individual actions and hides social relationships.

Killing Arone was clearly and obviously wrong. The perpetrators should have felt the overwhelming prohibition against killing that we inculcate in social discourse. They should have felt fear at the risk at which it placed them and their fellows—at the very least, anxiety for the uncertainty of outcome involved in transgressing a fundamental moral norm and shame at the thought of the possible outcome: criminal charges and imprisonment. Yet something allowed them to murder Arone, just as something allowed their compatriots to cover-up the murder and engage in further torture, abduction, and other morally reprehensible acts. Generally, the feeling of revulsion that most of us feel when confronted with the choice of killing another stops us. Consider the reluctance of subjects in a psychological study when they were confronted with a scenario of needing to choose to push an innocent onto a trolley track to save multiple other innocents on the trolley track. To kill feels wrong and is morally wrong, and, given that emotion drives social action, our feelings stop us from doing it. The calculative, greater-good answer in the trolley scenario is to sacrifice one to save the many; yet the moral actor is repulsed by the idea of being the active agent in the killing of one to save many. In the case of the Canadian soldiers’ criminal actions, the emotions that should have constrained their behavior, such as guilt, shame, anxiety, or fear did not stop them. Instead a different emotion overrode those moral mandates, namely, loyalty. The loyalty of the soldiers to one another was stronger than any other emotion. Their actions were informed by their bond to each other. Although we cannot ever know what iterative emotional process the soldiers went through to be able to murder Arone, the immoral act was facilitated by feelings, and those feelings did not prevent the murder. In such a context, the feeling that creates and allows action—loyalty to one’s comrades in arms—suppresses other feeling responses.

Emotions come into conflict with each other, they shift from being...
salient to simmering, they swirl and ebb. Fundamental to the process of (in)action that accompanies emotional existence is conflict between and among emotions. If our morals are emotionally led, then contiguous with this process will be moral dilemmas and conflicts. Our morals come into conflict just as our emotions do. When soldiers are called upon to enact their loyalty to each other or to their unit by being immoral in act or omission, a conflict occurs. The psychic resolution of that conflict will result in action. A soldier will be compelled to do something. The act will be framed by the circumstance, previous experience, training, and social interactions of the moment. It is at this point that an actor relies on feeling to guide action. A Canadian soldier described how moral values become subsumed under the group norm and strident group loyalty:

*The pressure is so strong that beyond the group, right and wrong lose their meaning. Only the group matters—until it’s just too much, and things start to come out on the outside. Like with Somalia. If it hadn’t come out from the outside, it probably never would have come out. I tried to talk with some guys at that time. They couldn’t talk. Silence. If they talk, they’re screwed. Somebody’ll find out about it sooner or later. In the infantry, it’s different. The group is smaller. You’re trained for war, much more brutally, and you’re isolated. No connections to the outside.*

Reports of moral conflict being resolved by recourse to loyalty are common. An Israeli soldier had great difficulty “telling on” another who had been stealing: “I wondered what I should do . . . to tell on him or not to tell . . . in the end, I didn’t say anything because I couldn’t squeal on a fellow soldier, somebody who in combat would be covering my back.”

Moral dilemmas, constituted by emotions, are what these soldiers are speaking of.

Dan Bar-On describes the testimony of an Israeli soldier who almost fired on a crowd of civilians that had surrounded his squad:

*[The soldier’s] poignant testimony runs along two main lines: a description of the reality of the incident that occurred during his army service, and his moral reaction to this incident with its potential for becoming a massacre. The tension that is formed in him between these two phases causes a deep emotional reaction for which he seeks an outlet (to scream, to shoot, to “whore,” to see the mental health officer, to protest).*

What the soldier identified in this report is the moral conflict he felt and how that caused deep emotional conflict. His duty and loyalty in the situation were to protect his squad, yet that would result in firing on civilians (who, though threatening, were not enemy soldiers). He was emotionally trapped between loyalty to his squad and fear and anxiety at the prospect of killing. His narrative vividly describes the emotional torment that he experienced. This torment was about the moral conflict embedded within his emotional life.

When engaging in violence (and other moral wrongs), soldiers must renegotiate the strong approbations against it. One way of doing this is to construct social circumstances in which one emotional expression can overwhelm other emotions that restrict and constrain us from committing wrongs. Thus, militaries encourage loyalty within a unit and discourage empathy for those who are not part of the in-group. Aggression and violence are condoned and encouraged.
This is designed to allow the soldier to suppress some emotions and permit others that fit the purpose of the military. Although it can be argued that the impact of a soldier’s job and the training that surrounds it should reduce the emotionally visceral impact of killing—for otherwise a soldier could not function in combat—this reduction should not apply to the action of killing civilians. In battle, the moral reluctance to kill is fundamentally replaced by emotions such as fear and anger—fear of being killed oneself, and anger at the situation. Randall Collins notes, “violence as it actually becomes visible in real-life situations is about the intertwining of human emotions of fear, anger, and excitement, in ways that run right against the conventional morality of normal situations.”36 The evocation of specific emotions allows soldiers to overcome moral restrictions on conduct.

Military Loyalty as a Vice?

The military uses emotional manipulation to encourage soldiers to act in certain ways. In one respect, this is functional for an organization that has been tasked with taking people and turning them into subjects capable of killing. However, the effect of inculcating a strong emotional disposition to be loyal to the unit is that it can overwhelm other emotional responses—such as fear, disgust, anxiety, and shame—that are centrally implicated in maintaining normative moral positions. Herbert Kelman and Lee Hamilton argue that loyalty can have a bolstering effect that encourages blind obedience.37 Conversely, Samuel Huntington claims that loyalty was explicitly encouraged within the military during the twentieth century to allow initiative, and “initiative was reconciled with obedience through loyalty.”38 Irrespective of which view gives us a better understanding, loyalty is central to these views on military structure and behavior. However, these studies do not go far enough to explain the actions and feelings of those soldiers involved in criminal activity. As Peter Olsthoorn argues, “the virtue of loyalty is a fundamental military virtue, yet it is questionable, to say the least, if a display of loyalty really is always that virtuous.”39 As I will show below, the very social circumstance of military loyalty encourages malfeasance.

One interesting parallel to military loyalty is gang and police loyalty. Criminal gangs also employ loyalty as a key emotion and draw upon familial ties to maintain this.40 In policing, the mandate not to betray fellow police officers, known as “the blue wall of silence,” also draws upon familial ties. As John Kleinig argues, “loyalty in police organizations can be very similar to the loyalty that characterizes friendships and familial relations—at least the language is the same.”41 Kleinig suggests that a fundamental difference between genuine filial relationships and those that purport to be such is that whereas the family is in a sense natural, police, gangs, and the military are artificial associations. However, for many who are part of one of the latter associational entities, it becomes their family and becomes as “natural” as any other type of close, tight, interdependent relationships.
relationship that relies on all involved performing certain acts of maintenance. Of significance here is the fact that loyalty is centrally implicated in the moral failings of criminal gangs, the police code of silence, and military units. This indicates the ability to generalize about loyalty determining both moral and immoral emotive action. Military loyalty and malfeasance is thus not a special-case scenario or an outlying example of moral failing through feeling.

Loyalty operates in layers, yet the strength of a particular layer at a particular time and place depends on the social circumstances that the actor confronts. Keller argues that “values distinctively associated with various loyalties are not the only values, and values of the different kinds sometimes conflict. Sometimes, even though there is value in your being loyal, you can only be loyal by sacrificing other things that are also of value.” The conflict between layers of loyalty is one of enduring moral reflection and a staple theme of literature. Should we be loyal first and foremost to family, friend, nature, or religion—which of these competing claims to our loyalty is stronger?

The military seeks to limit layer-based conflicts of loyalty and assert the primacy of loyal service and of giving one’s autonomy over to the needs of the group. Andrew Alexandra asserts that

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\text{to construct such an instrument of obedience it may be necessary to create a hierarchical organization, and instill in its members habits of deference and unquestioning obedience to authority, and loyalty to the organization. Such habits are antithetical to the democratic virtues of autonomy, independence of mind, and equality of regard.}
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Consequently, following the argument I’ve laid out in the preceding sections, the soldier will be predisposed to committing moral wrongs. What is important to stress in our critique of military loyalty is that it is not acceptable to use loyalty to justify moral harm. As Driver argues, “loyalty as a moral norm neither requires nor permits the violation of the rights of others.” Loyalty is not an excuse for harm, yet—too often—loyalty is the explanation.

In his study of military culture, Per Sandin postulates that virtues can exist within a group context and that the military is a collective in which we should reasonably expect to see them. Formalized, hierarchical positions within the military exist irrespective of the actor who fills the role and this interchangeability is paramount to command and control. The lieutenant of a platoon is the commander, irrespective of the actual individual who fills the uniform. This line of reasoning leads Sandin to argue that virtues such as justice do exist for the collective. Given the presence of loyalty as a military virtue, it is not unreasonable to ask whether loyalty can be considered a collective virtue that exists within an organization irrespective of who happen to be its members. This line of reasoning echoes a debate within the sociology-of-emotions literature about whether and how emotions exist beyond the individual. From one perspective, emotions can also exist as part of a social structure. We can thus conceive of military loyalty as a virtue of the organization, of its members, and of the social purpose it serves within a particular society. However, just because it is a virtue, it does not follow that the acts
that arise from it are moral: the motive of loyalty may be good, but the act that expresses it does not have to be. This perspective enables us to consider the loyal Nazi as virtuously loyal, even though his actions are corrupt. In a contrary view, Stephen Coleman argues that loyalty cannot be separated from its outcome. It is, in effect, an instrumental virtue whose value lies in what one is loyal to. When commenting upon his infamous obedience experiments, Stanley Milgram notes the irony of loyalty being so highly valued in an organization, yet the very same property that enables wrong to be done. This offers a fruitful area of further inquiry: if virtues and emotions can exist at the collective level, how do we theorize the vice of collective action? Where and how do we feel the right and wrong of interaction when it is framed by and through collective emotion?

**Conclusion**

If we accept that loyalty is an emotion and deploy a strong epistemic emotionist argument to explain the moral experience of soldiers, an explanation of criminality emerges. Loyalty as an emotion directs social action; it helps to determine what, when, and how we do what we do. Our moral worldview is rarely a result of deep philosophical reflection; it is embedded in how we feel. Consequently, loyalty directs moral choices. A particular danger occurs when loyalty, as a result of socialization processes, comes to dominate the moral life of the soldier. This inevitably predisposes the soldier to make immoral choices, driven by a loyalty to their unit. Loyalty in and of itself is not a vice, but its deployment in the context of soldiering probably is. However, the emotional challenge of actually getting soldiers to fight is a fundamental one for militaries, one that they have answered by using loyalty to emotionally motivate their memberships.

**Notes**

5 I have spent an entire book arguing for this particular view. See Connor, *The Sociology of Loyalty*.
8 Ibid., 22.


12 Ibid., 25.

13 Ibid., 29.

14 Ibid., 32.


29 Ibid., 252.

30 Winslow, “Misplaced Loyalties.”


32 Connor, *The Sociology of Loyalty*.

33 Quoted in Winslow, “Misplaced Loyalties,” 362.

34 Elizur and Yishay-Krien, “Participation in Atrocities,” 257.


38 Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 304.


42 Connor, *The Sociology of Loyalty*.


47 Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*.


49 Driver, “Cosmopolitan Virtue.”

